Introduction

44
In linking neuroscience with conceptual analysis, our article 'Foundationalism and neuroscience' (Keestra and Cowley, 45 2009) examined what empirical findings about the brain mean for psychological concepts and vice versa. Writing for 46 linguists and others interested in cognitive neuroscience, we stressed that the systems which underlie perception, language 47 and action feature complex interdependencies. In examining conceptual implications, we contrasted our view with that of and lay-persons alike are bound to draw on explanatory criteria. Accordingly, we find fault with PFN and object that B&H 53 remain largely silent about methods and findings that, in our view, challenge their position. 1 In replying to our arguments, 54 Hacker and Bennett (this volume) suggest that we failed to understand what they had written. 55 We regard this colourful rhetoric as showing substantial differences. The most important may be that while B&H take for 56 granted that we converge on knowing how to use the words for psychological concepts, we doubt that, to the extent to which 57 this exists, it always depends on rule-governed use. We are sceptical that the meanings of concepts ''are given by what are 58 accepted as correct explanations of meaning by the community of speakers'' (Bennett and Hacker, 2003, p. 382 ) that is to say 59 ''competent speakers, using words correctly'' (Bennett and Hacker, 2003 , p. 400, italics added). In our view, where psycholog- 60 ical concepts follow such usage, they are less likely to follow strict logical limits than to feature the variability and ambiguity 61 of prototypes. 2 In contrast, in their reply to our paper (Hacker and Bennett (H&B) , 2011) liken the definition of psychological 62 concepts to using a nominal definition of vixen as a female fox. In a psychological example, H&B invoke ''the word 'conscious' 63 and its cognates'' (Hacker and Bennett, in press ). Rejecting our scepticism, they take issue with our claim that they posit this 64 view. Rather, they say that ''We took it for granted that we all know how to use the word 'conscious; and its cognates -for that 65 is all that is necessary for the clarification of the concept of consciousness''. Given their faith that this is known to competent 66 speakers, they fail to understand either our scepticism or our challenge. Since we do not think that conceptual analysis alone 67 can provide foundations for neuroscience, we contrast this with our 'coherentist' view. Accordingly, we stress the value of con-68 ceptual analysis in making informative use of empirical work. Defending this in relation to examples, we turned to the cases of 69 'blind-sight' and 'distraction-from-pain' used in PFN. In developing our argument, we return to these cases below. In our view, 70 the fact that we can discuss such concepts supports neuroscientist Changeux and hermeneutic philosopher Ricoeur's view that 71 semantic tolerance can supplement semantic critique (Changeux and Ricoeur, 2000) . Conversely, we deem B&H's method of lim-72 ited value for empirical investigation because it is rule-bound. We are unimpressed by a work that, in a colourful expression, 73 amounts to constraining ''draughts players by pointing out that there is no checkmate in draughts'' (Hacker and Bennett, in 74 press) for, in our view, the analogy does not apply to neuroscience.
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There are big contrasts between neuroscience, neuroscientific writings and games like draughts. (Ashby and Ell, 2001 ). Obviously, categories or concepts based upon a prototype allow for more flexibility in acquisition and use than do those that are dependent upon a particular rule. 3 Research challenges the presence of conceptual consensus or consensus about behavioural criteria in the application of psychological concepts. This holds, naturally enough, for transcultural differences in not only psychological and psychiatric concepts but also their behavioural expression (Chaturvedi and Bhugra, 2007) . Recent debate emphasizes intercultural variability in describing the processes and functions that link perception, motivation and cognition to behavior (Arnett, 2008; Henrich, et al., 2010) . It would be equally mistaken to conclude that, within a group, there is prevailing consensus. We therefore seek coherence between sources of insights in order to limit the impact of its absence. work that sets out to scrutinise both anomalous and normal cases.
146
Recognition of biological complexity underpins our challenge to the view that, in PFN's sense, neuroscience has 147 conceptual foundations. In spite of intimations to the contrary (Hacker and Bennett, in press) we neither think nor say that 4 A different case of mereological reasoning emerges when psychological predicates are applied, not to parts of a person, but to a group of persons (as in collective action or collective memory). If, as we think, such descriptions are valuable, this confirms both the worth of mereological reasoning and the need for semantic tolerance. 5 Debates on matters such as euthanasia, abortion and animal rights testify to not just ethical differences, but also disagreements about concepts like consciousness. Though some forms of non-sense can be avoided, we deny that definitions of being conscious and its cognates permit mathematical-like precision. 6 The absence of empirical support for their strict delineations of the meaning of concepts leads Sytsma to call the method of PFN 'anti-empirical conceptual analysis'. He shows that the authors overestimate the representativeness of their intuitions in that, for example, many respondents do apply 'calculate' to computers -though B&H reject this as nonsensical (Sytsma, 2010) .
the writers of PFN aim to deduce hypotheses or theories from conceptual foundations. Demoss and Devereux, 1988). For Aristotle, explanatory pluralism renders definition of biological functions and properties quite unlike defining mathematical objects (Gotthelf, 1997) . Like Aristotle, we think that this also holds for psychological functions which vary both in different kinds and within an individual. Thus bodily aspects are needed in analysis, description and explanation of psychological functions (van der Eijk, 1997). 9 We follow Bechtel (2008) in seeking out -not primarily explanatory laws -but biological structures that perform functions in virtue of the operation of component parts, component operations, and their organization. Taken together, these are responsible for one or more phenomena. 10 We quoted the observation that for such reasons, ''the traditional divisions among perception, cognition, and action look increasingly unhelpful'' (Clark, 1997, p. 221).
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the observable variability by showing that, at times, explanatory components are needed in defining functions. pursued in ways that lead to innovation in the conceptual network. Indeed, the mismatch between having and feeling a 244 sensation exemplifies the blurred conceptual borders, hiatuses, and overlaps that characterize the incomprehensive classifica-245 tory systems of natural languages. As argued below, the phenomenon and its description become heuristics in studying neural 246 mechanisms that are recruited for pain and for attention -which can indeed be shown to interact (Valet et al., 2004) . One 11 In our paper, we show that the neural underpinnings of language overlap with those of action and perception. H&B, by contrast, treat language as mapping onto public verbal patterns and overlook such issues (they do, however, deny that they have a 'theory of language'). Building on the claim that there are no a priori linguistic units (e.g. Harris, 1998), a growing community trace language to how we co-ordinate action and perception (see, Cowley, 2007 Cowley, , 2009 ) and thus regard it as irreducible to its verbal aspect. In this context, we leave such issues aside. 12 Stokhof diagnoses in recent Wittgenstein interpretations a 'quest for purity', where Wittgensteinian philosophers seek strict autonomy against science and argues that Wittgenstein himself had a more nuanced position (Stokhof, 2010) . We thank Martin Stokhof for discussing this issue with one of us. 13 Of course the authors may have some other mathematical singularity in mind. If this is the case, it would be interesting to know what this was.
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advantage of conceptual analysis is precisely that it can reveal atypical cases which, linked to empirical work, bring important 248 issues to the fore. to a causal and theoretical pluralism that sustains scientific debate (Beatty, 1997) . This requires semantic criticism associ-278 ated with tolerance. Protesting, H&B note that, while we admit that B&H deny conceptual conservatism, we ascribe precisely 279 this problem to their work. Overlooking the contrast between their view and our case for conceptual flexibility, they cite our 280 move as an example of ''the quality of the reasoning in K&C's discussion of our book'' (Hacker and Bennett, in press, p. 461).
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Once again, using colourful rhetoric, they step over our arguments. To be sure, if one accepts that psychological concepts of ''blind-sight'' would focus on a phenomenon that is quite different from that understood by those who contribute to the 294 alleged consensus about perceiving. Given our view on concepts, we consider this unwarranted, unnecessary, and undesir-295 ably restrictive.
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We link their view of conceptual foundations with conservatism: ''There are dangers in clinging to logico-grammatical 297 restrictions'' because ''at times, empirical findings can be used to make conceptual adjustments to a phenomenon under 14 They stress that they ''lay down no restriction on linguistic innovation whatsoever'' (Hacker and Bennett, 2011, p. 461 ). However, this does not address our scepticism. By taking a community consensus for granted, they grant limited space for divergence and variability of opinions. Instead of promoting semantic tolerance, they assume a strict separation of sense and non-sense. 15 In his Postscript, Kuhn urges that incommensurability be seen as a matter of ''different language communities and that their communication problems be analyzed as problems of translation'' (Kuhn, 1970, p. 175) . This view of the problem of translation stems from Quine; according to PFN (cf. Bennett and Hacker, 2003, p. 130) this had a strong yet misleading influence on cognitive scientists. In our view, this has no bearing on our discussion of the problem of incommensurability.
298 investigation, without implying that a totally different phenomenon is at stake -as B&H proclaim (p. and pathological conditions. Given the complexity of etiology and underlying biology, it will be recognized that quantitative or 336 dimensional traits characterize both kinds of condition which are, therefore, continuous (Hyman, 2007 16 Subsequently we discussed synaesthesia. While accepting that, on the accepted definition of number, it ''needs no science to tell us that it is senseless to ascribe colours to numbers'' (Bennett and Hacker, 2003 , p. 133), we referred to research confirming that synaesthesia points to uncommon cross-wiring in neural mechanisms that are usually devoted to different processing domains. Another case that shows the difficulty of strictly defining psychological concepts is that of having an emotion without knowing what its object is. B&H call this a 'limiting case' in that the rule is said to be that emotions have a definite object (ibid. 219), whereas existential philosophers assess a limiting case like ''Angst'' as central to human existence. Once again, this raises doubts about the dimensions of any community of competent speakers. 17 Semantic tolerance regarding concepts like 'gene' has not impeded scientific progress. Rather, it has lead to a situation where it is prudent to ask if the concept conflates two distinct phenomena, as is evident from their causal structure (Stotz and Griffiths, 2004) . This is no purely conceptual matter in that it involves the evaluation and estimation of causal processes. 18 An integration of insights from cognitive science and from hermeneutics with respect to the phenomenon of imitation is presented in (Keestra, 2008 
